The Politics of Shit: Privatisation, Dar Es Salaam and Neo Colonial Arrogance.

         Figure 1, The waterworks in Monopoly South Africa:source

Leading on from the last post, here I consider other political contentions of Sanitation. A key issue in WASH is who runs and finances sanitation infrastructure. Given Africa's sanitation crisis, there was a push in the 1990s to switch public sanitation providers with private ones in the hope it would improve the situation(McKinley, 2010). This was part of a broader transformation in development policy that was being aggressively encouraged by the World Bank and the IMF where state-led projects were discredited in favour of market-oriented initiatives, often as criteria for loans(O'Keefe.et al, 2015). 

Figure 2 Water privatisation contracts in sub-Saharan Africa, from 1960 to 2002: source

Looking at figure 2, I can't help but reflect on my first post and Wainana’s identification of the trope of white saviourism- where in the western imaginary Africa is in perpetual need of intervention from Europeans. Here, western-based organisations like the IMF have pushed African governments to accept the takeover of WASH infrastructure by European companies. In recent years there has been a pattern of renationalisation of this infrastructure because privatisation has not been more effective at service provision and has aggravated issues and cost lives (Mutebi, 2012). This is exemplified by the case of Dar es Salaam.

In 2005, A British-German consortium, Bi water, took over the City’s water system facilitated by the Tanzanian government as a condition of an IMF loan. Immediately the inherent priorities of a private company whose interest is to maximise profits came into conflict with the need to serve large sections of the population that couldn't afford to pay its hiked-up bills. The company disconnected whole areas to force people to pay up, and poor families turned to unsafe and informal water sources instead of paying increased bills. The company refused to invest in new pipes and water quality decreased(Lier,2008). The city was better off before(Rugemalila.et al,2015). 

In an absurd episode, the UK Government commissioned a £250,000 music video in a public relations effort to encourage Tanzanians to accept the privatisation scheme. The world’s first de-nationalisation pop song. It includes the lyrics-

 "Governments and business people,/ Tanzania and foreigners,/ are like four legs of a table/ at which our children will one day feast,” and "Our old industries are dry like crops and privatisation brings the rain."

The well-paid singer- Captain John: source

The hubris of western organisations in proselytising about the benefits of the privatisation scheme before Biwater cut off supply to the poorest is shocking and the aptness of Wainaina’s expose of the western neocolonial outlook and arrogance is displayed. 

Private investment can play a useful role but on a smaller, complementary scale. In rural Uganda government authorities have successfully organised private contractors to augment the maintenance of water supply services when there are worker shortages, or for specialised expertise for example when digging new boreholes(Mutebi,2012). 

The Tanzania case study shows WASH reform based on wholesale privatisation of a region’s infrastructure is an ill-suited solution to the sanitation crisis. Particularly given the fact that all countries, like the USA, that have attained near-universal sanitation access did so through public initiatives. Major new financing sources will be needed to replicate those initiatives in Africa(Bayliss, 2013). Clamping down on illicit finance which sucks money out of the continent tax-free, would be a potential option, given it's worth 90$ billion dollars(Signe,2013). This would require unprecedented international cooperation to deal with the world’s tax havens.